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This paper attempts to explore the implications of shadow pricing
!
the evaluation of four investment alternatives recently faced by the
government of Indonesia. The
a welfare accounting exercise
shadow pricing procedure adopted involves
which attempts to estimate the social benefits
and costs of public production or use of commodities in the presence of
1/
market distortions.— The particular market distortions of interest in
this paper are: (a) a divergence between the social rate of return on
capital and the social rate of discount; (b) a divergence between the wage
paid in the advanced sector and the social opportunity cost of labor; and
(c) a divergence between the official exchange rate and the social value
of a unit of foreign exchange. Income distributional considerations are
ignored. Section 2 sets out the physical and econc~miccharacteristics of
the investment alternatives concerned and briefly reviews the literature
that has recently appeared on their relative merits. The decision criteria
that are appropriate for evaluating alternatives of this kind are con-
sidered in Section 3, and the shadow prices to be used in the evaluation
are derived in Section 4 and estimated in Section 5. The results of the
economic evaluation under varying sets of assumpticms are presented in
Section 6.2. Rice Milling Techniques to Be Analyzed
The four techniques to be analyzed are alternative rice milling
facilities of varying capital/labor intensities. The physical character-
istics of these facilities were recently described in some detail in an
engineering consultant firm’s report
2/
to the government of Indonesia.—
Some physical and economic characteristics of these facilities, together
with those of the traditional technique, hand-pounding, are summarized
in Table 1. Table 1 expresses the various inputs required and outputs
produced per 1000 metric tons of rough rice input per year.
Table 1:
3/
Characteristics of Rice Milling Techniques—
(standardized at 1000 metric tons of rough rice input per year)
Small Large Sma11 Large
rice rice bulk bulk Hand-
mill mill facility facility pounding
(A) (B) (c) (D) (H)
Milled rice






per year 12 6.4 3.75 1.81 Icy





exchange 38.3 63.7 69.5 73.0 -
Price received for
milled rice )+? 48 49.5 50 40
(Rp. perkg.)
Sources: ‘1’immer (9, pp. 27-8), Weitz-Hettelsater (11, p. 373), and
Collier et al. (p. 112). .——The consulting firm’s report gave little attention to the economic
merits of these alternatives, concerning itself mainly with their engineer-
ing efficiency in the extraction of milled rice from the rough rice input.
This led, particularly in the first draft of the firm’s report, to the
recommendation of an investment package that concentrated 75 percent of its
milling capacity in the two most capital-intensive of the four alternatives
(C and D above). The wisdom of this recommendation was challenged in
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later work by Timmer.– Timmer pointed out that the recommendation was
based at best on narrow engineering efficiency criteria, and at worst on
the simple presumption that the more capital-intensive techniques must be
desirable since they are more “modern.”
To analyze the economic merits of these four milling techniques rela-
tive to the traditional technique, hand-pounding, Timmer constructed a unit
isoquant in value added from the data given in Table 1 and the assumption
that the rough rice input cost Rp. 18 per kg. This isoquant gave the var-
ious combinations of capital cost and workers employed per year required to




rice input) for each of the five techniques. The cost minimizing
on this isoquant was then found graphically by drawing a series of
the slope of which reflected the present value of the wage bill for
employing a worker for a period of 50 years, and obtaining a corner solution.
After considering three alternative wage rates and three rates of discountt
Timmer concluded that the small rice mill (A) was the optimal technique
except under highly unrealistic assumptions.








k pk X:t - pG X:t
where: x; is the capital cost of the total investment in the kth
technique, assumed to be fully incurred in year zero, Wk is the wage
paid in technique k, % is the total number of workers employed by
the kth technique in year t,
k G
‘kt and ‘kt
are the quantities of
milled rice of type k produced and rough rice (gabah) used by technique
k in year t (assumed constant over time), while pk and PG are the
market prices of these two kinds of rice, respectively. Obviously,
Timmer’s criterion is equivalent to maximizing the inverse of the above
expression.
In this study the four alternative milling facilities are considered
explicitly as alternative government investments. Since public sector
investment in milling facilities is unlikely to increase the total amount
of rough rice produced it is assumed that any rice milled in the public
sector is diverted in full from some other milling activity, Recent exper-
ience suggests that this activity would be hand-pounding with hired female
labor, since that activity is rapidly vanishing as privately and publicly
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owned mechanical milling facilities expand.— To
effects of diverting rice from hand-pounding to a
it is necessary to value:
1. the milled rice produced,
2, the hand-pounded rice foregone,
3. the resources used by the mill, and
analyze the welfare
publicly owned rice mill,
4. the resources released from hand-pounding.5
No free trade in rice occurs across ~.ndonesia’sboundaries, all
trade being arranged by inter-governmental agreements. It is assumed
in this study that marginal changes in the qunntit.yof mil].edrice pro-
duced in the public.sector would not affect tl~eseagreements and ]lence
that, for the purposes of shadow pricing, rice is a non-traded good--
even though its domestic price is often affected by chan~es in tl~einter-
national price. The only traded goods invol.vcdin tileeval~lationof tl~cs~’
rice-milling projects, then, are the imported capital soods required in
the initial construction. The shadow price of’foreign exc.lmnge is rele-
vant only to the valuation of these commodi.tics. All construction costs
are assumed to be i.ncurrecl .inyear zero, and the streams of labor input,
rough rice input, and milled rice output shown in ‘I)able 1.are assumed to
be constant over a 20–year project lil_e,after which prf)jcctcapital has
zero scrap value. It is assumed that the only useahle r~’so~lrce released
from hand-pounding is hired female labor.
3. Decision Criterion for Choice of Teclln=ue ———-. .—. —-
Suppose, for simplicity, that tilegovernment’s welfare function is
given by
W(co, cl, ... , C’T),
where C is aggregate consumption in year r, I ‘r
= O is the present,
and T = T is a finite but distant horizon. A small change in welfare
is given by6











Normalizing by set~.i.ngWO = 1 and notin~j that
w h’
wt. z .;2 . ‘[-s ‘2 ‘“l . ~ ——. . ..-
W ... w. “woo’ T-.L T-2 1
it is easily verifiecl that
,. dC,c
dW = j ------— .
T:(I(H-i)”[
Applying the welfare accounting approach to sl~adowpricing, we now
define the shadow price of commodity m at time t, S:, to be the effect
of a change in its public producticm at time t, xm
on social welfare,
t’
discounted to the present. l’hu s
It is now clear that, given the above assumptions, the effect on social.
welfare of public production usins technique k is expressed by the netpresent value of the :;tr~::~m ~~ aggregate (X)n.SIJmp~~On that it Sent.r[]tes.
Denoting this by ‘k ‘
If the public sector was not constrained in its investment behavior,
it clearly should continue to invest in every avail.ab].e rice rnilli.ng
technique for which ‘k > 0“
suppose that i.t[aces two kinds of constrain~s,
one on the total supply of rough rice that may be diverted from hand-
pounding in year t, ~t,
t = 1, ... , 20 ,
and another on the tots.Lvolume of investment that m,aybe f’inanced,K,
.
To obtain the necessary conditions for optimal public production in rice
milling we maximize ‘k
subject to the above two constraints. We thus
formulate the Lagrangian
Sk Se SG K
where and !;
t’t’t
are the shadow prices of milled rice oftype k, labor
From the
employed, rough rice and capital.respectively.







t(l t ‘t 9
axkt
all k; E=l, ... , 20;
all k; t=l, ... , 20;
these expressions, either the term inside the parentheses must
be zero or the input level outside the parentheses must be zero. In the
latter case the technique is not used at all since we assume that a zero
level of any input ensures zero output. When only one of the two constrains
considered is binding (as we would normally expect), only one technique will
be used. Equating the term in parentl]eses in each of the above equations




t=l , ... , 20;
ax:t ‘i
ax:t




t=l., ... , 20;9
and
Thus the relative shadow prices of the various commodities sl~ou Ld
reflect their direct welfare costs or benefits plus, in L]]ecase of inl>([Ls
subject to supply constraints, .apremium which reflects the welfare C’OSL.S
of those supply constraints. It is easily verified that




is defined as before.
If the constraint on the supply of rough rice at time t is binding,
.
then A: > 0, and x~~t will be the same no matter which technique is
,,
chosen.’ Likewise if the.investment constraint is binding, AK ~ O and
< will be the same no matter which technique is chosen. Suppose the




must then be the same no matter which technj.queis chosen, the
ranking of techniques according to the above criterion cannot be chanl;ed






since a is the same for all techniques and can be ignored. If tllc!
c
constraint on rough rice input is binding and ‘kt




for each technique (which is so for the facilities considered Ilere,
given the initial investment), but the investment constral.ntis not bind-






It is now clear that if
is constrained by the supply
may be ranked by considering
the investment behavior of the government
of a single input, alternative investments
their returns to that input--namely by com-
paring the amount of net present value they generate per unit of that
input--where the dual variable corresponding to that constraint has not
been considered in the calculation of net present value. This can pro-
duce only a ranking, however. To determine which of the :investments
should be undertaken, if any, it is necessary to compute tilevalue of
the dual variable concerned. Furthermore, when more than one constraint
is binding, not even a ranking can be achieved without knowledge of the
relative values of the dual variables corresponding to the various
constraints.
This provides some insight on the implications of the way a “project”
is normally defined in benefit-cost analysis. When there is some unique
natural resource such as a dam site on a river it seems natural to compare11
alternative dams by choosing the one which returns the nighest net present
value to that dam site. I%is is correct provifie(i that the only bindinfi
constraint on the supply of inputs for dam construction is the uniqueness
of the dam site. Otherwise, in order to rank the alternatives it i.sneces-
sary to know the value of the dual variable corresponding to the dam site
relative to those corresponding to the other constraints, or the absolute
values of each of the dual variables
4. Derivation of Shadow Prices
This section derives the shadow
technique exercise. The inputs used
capital, labor, forei~n exchange and
but one.
prices to be used :inthe choice or
by the four milling techniques are
rough rice. Rough rice is valueclat
the value of the hand-pounded rice foregone when it is diverted from hand-
pounding to mechanical milling minus the value of the hired labor released.
The final consumption goods to be valued are milled and hand-pounded rice.
Except in the cases of capital and foreign exchange, we derive below the
various shadow prices in terms of aggregate consumption in year t, S
. m
(L)”
This can be expressed in terms of the numeraire, aggregate consumption in
the initial period (year zero), by writing
s: = (l+i)-t s~t) .
4.1. Shadow price of capital
Recalling from the previous section that the shadow price of a com-
modity is, given the assumptions listed, the present value of the stream
of aggregate consumption it generates, the shadow price of capital used in
a public investment is the present value of the stream of aggregate12
consumption foregone by its use. Thus
r. JCL
SK= ~ 1 .—— —.. -. .. .. .
t=O (l+i)t Jx~
Consider first the shadow price of a unit.of i.nvestmentj s’, made
in that part of the economy where the funclsused for public investmmt
are obtained. We will.suppose, for simpl.i.city, tlmt tlli.s alternative
investment yields an annuity of value q. l’hatis, Rp. 1.invested in
year zero yields Rp. q each year indefinitely. q is somet imes referred
to as the marginal productivity of capital.. Suppose that a proportion
2
c of these annual returns is consumed, and the remainder .isreinvcstdd.
SI
These reinvested funds are themselves valued at . and Il(!n(:e
act
—._ . c2q + (l–Aqsl , 0 ~ C2 ‘ ‘1 —.
@
and
‘ c2q + (1-c2)qs1”
s~=~ —.——.——.—
~=() (l+i)t “
We now use the fact that
I
and solve for S , giving
s’=—c2q -.
i- (1-c2)qJ.3
If capital employed in the investment considered comes entirely OUL
SK = S1
of investment elsewhere, then ; but i.fa proportion C.3 of this
capital comes out of alternative consumption witt} I–C3 cornin[: out of
investment, then
SK = C3 + (1-C3)S* , ()<C3 <1.. .
The parameters C2, C3 and q can potentially be estimated empirically.
But, as the analysis of Section 3 implies, the social rate of cliscoun~,
i, involves a value judgment. In this study we treat the social rate of
discount as an unknown exogenous parameter and attempt to show the i.mpSi.-
cations of different discount rates for choice of techni.quc.
It is possible to argue, however, that in economies where the rate
of investment is determined primarily by private decision makers acting
independently, i s q. Suppose that the capital market functions effi-
.P ciently and that the private rate of discount, 1 , as expressed in market
behavior, and the private rate of return, qp, are equated. We can then
.P i < 1 , since i argue that _ reflects society’s concern for the welfare
6/
of future generations, whereas ip does not.-– Further-more,we can argue
that normally q ~_qp in a dual economy, since market wages in the advanced
sector exceed the





Clearly, i<q implies s~ > 1.
cost of labor, and hence the social
7/




Shadow price of labor employed —.
From the analysis of Section 3, the shadow price of a worker employed
public investment project in year t, in terms of a~;gregate consump-
in year t, is given by
Writing Wk for the wage paid in technique k, w,, for tilewage paid in
hand-pounding, which we assume to be eclualto the worker’s marginal product
there, and C1 for workers’ propensity to consume, wc then obtain, usinf;
aggregate consumption in year t as numeraire,
‘;t)
= Wk{cz + (1-C2)S1} - Chwk-wll) - (:kj(wk-wh)s~ .
The first term in this expression is the cost in terms of aggre~ate
consumption in year t of paying the worker a wage of
‘lC out of govern–
8/
ment revenue. The second term is the social valuation- :interms of aggre-
gate present consumption of that part of the worker’s increased income that
he consumes, and the third term is the
savings. Rearranging, we have
%)
= Wk(cl-cz) (s%) +
4.3. Shadow price of labor displaced
Given the framework adopted here,
social valuation of his additional
Wh{cl + (l-C1)S1} l
the shadow price of a worker dis-




is the value of his contribution to production in his1.5
alternative employment. Writing w:] for the wage paid in tlm alternative




= Wa{c + (l-cbsT”}.
4.4. Shadow price of foreign exchangg
Suppose a rupiah’s worth of foreign exchange is spent on import.in}l
the traded commodity z. The number of units of commodity z this wil.”1
purchase is given by llp~, where p: is the c.i.f. price OC commodity z
at the official exchange rate. The contribution each l]nitmakes to our
numeraire, aggregate consumption, is given by its domestic price, pz,
as faced by consumers. Thus this rupiah’s worth of foreign exchange spent
on commodity z contributes p~lp: to aggregate consumption. If, .instcad,
a rupiah’s worth of foreign exchange is spread over Z commodities, where
L
a is the proportion spent on goocl z, then the shadow price of foreign
exchange is Siven by
4.5. Shadow prices of milled and hand--unded rice -——-
Since the market price of a non-tradecl final consumption good measures
its contribution to aggregate consumption, the shadow prices of the con-
sumption goods milled and hand-pounded rice used in this study are their
market prices.16
5. Estimation of Shadow Prices
The main parametric assumptions to be rnacle in this chapter are sum-
marized in Table 2.
Table 2: Major Parametric Assumptions
Parameter q i c’ C2 C3 Wk Wh w Sr
a —— .
Value 0.25 0.07-0.25 0.95 0.75 {~ 75 57,000 17,000 9,500 1.2
.
Units - Rp./yr Rp./yr Rr./yr -
Capital used in construction of rice milling projects is assumed to
be derived from aid funds from a foreign government. This assumption seems
appropriate since the engineering study referred to in Section 1 was
financed by the United States Agency for International Development, even
though it was directed to the Government of Indonesia. These aid funds
could be made available in three different ways: (a) they could be given
for use by the Indonesia government for whatever purpose it desired,
(b) they could be restricted to use for general investment, and (c) they
could be tied to specific investment prc~jects. In case (a) these funds
are indistinguishable from general government revenue. We assume that 75%
of these funds come out of government consumption and 25% out of government
3
investment (i.e., c = 0.75) which yields an annual return of 25%. Of
these returns 75% are consumed and 25% reinvested, etc. Thus
SK
= 0.75 +0.25 S1. In case (b) funds used for investment in rice milling
come entirely out of alternative government investment (i.e., c3 = O), and
KI
then S = S . In case (c) the terms under which the aid funds are given1.7
become relevant and this case is explored in Section 6.
The range of discount rates considered here is 0.07 to 0.25. For
i < 0.0625 the shadow price of investment :isno longer defined, and so —
0.07 seems a natural lower bound. The upper bound of 0.25 seems appro-
priate in view of our earlier argument that i ~q. ‘1’he values of the
shadow price of capital in
(though not in that order)
in Figure 1. Table 2 also
stantially above the wages
both cases (a) and (b) above arc tabulated
in the first two columns of Table 3, and plotted
shows that wages paid in rice milling are s(lb-
paid in hand-pouncling and in tilealternative
employment, rice harvesting. Table 3 shows, in the third and fourth
columns, the shadow prices OE labor employed in and displaced by rice
milling respectively. These are pl.ottecl in Figure 2. The final.two
columns of Table 3 show the relative shadow prices of labor employed and
capital for various rates of discount. When SK = S1 the sllaclow price
of labor relative to capital falls as the rate of d~.scount falls; but
SK
when = 0.75 +0.25S1, the opposite occurs.
It has not been possible to obtain the price information necessary
to apply the expression for the shadow price of foreign exchange developed
in Section 4.4. Indonesia does not seem to have a seriously distorted
exchange rate, however,
SF > ~ is the
and the only reason for suspecting
existence of tariffs. Nominal tariff rates are quite high, many being at
least 100%, but smuggling abounds and domestic prices seldom rise more
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6. Choice of Technique Results
In Figures 3, 4, and 5 we plot the relationship between net present
value and the social rate of discount for each technique. The data in
Table 9 and the shadow prices in Table 3 have been
different sets of assumptions. In Figure 3, panel
the supply of rough rice input is constraining the
used, but with six
(a)jit is assumed that
government’s investment
behavior, so the results are expressed in net present value (in Rp. millions)
per 1000 tons of rough rice input.
K
It is further assumed that S = S1 and
that all facilities operate at full capacity. Panel (b) is based on the
same assumptions, except that all facilities operate at
In Figure 4 it is assumed that SK = 0.75 + 0.25 S1, but
assumptions are made as in panels (a) and (b) of Figure
only 75% of capacity.
otherwise the same
3, respectively.
In Figure 5 we assume that current investment cost constrains the govern-
ment’s investment behavior, so net present value is divided by investment
cost (in Rp. millions). Otherwise, the same assumptions are made as in
panels (a) and (b) of Figures 3 and 4.
The rice prices presented in Table 1 are suspect on two grounds.
Firstly, they are based on 1971 rice prices, which are well below current
(1975) prices, and may well prove to be far below the long-term mean price
in real terms. Secondly, the prices in Table 1 assume substantial price
differentials between the rice produced by the four facilities. Although
Weitz-Hettelsater (1972) made similar assumptions, there is little evidence
10/
to support these differentials,— and it is of some interest to see the
implications of relaxing this assumption, as well as the one
Table 4 summarizes the relationship between net present




for various increases in rice prices. For each rate of discount and each
assumed increase in rice prices (zero, 25%, 50%, 75X and 1.00%)we present
the ranking of techniques according to net present value per unit of rough
rice input. The position of the slash (/) in each ranking indicates the
change from positive to negative values. Panel (a) of Table 4 assumes that
price differentials between techniques are as in Table 1, while Panel (b)
assumes that the price of the rice produced by all facilities is the same
as that for technique (A). These results are summarized further in the
two acceptance diagrams presented in Figure 6. These diagrams show the
optimal technique for each combination of social rate of discount and per-
cent increase in the price of rice. Panels (a) and (b) relate to Panels (a)
and (b) of Table 4, respectively. The shaded areas indicate regions in
which N
k
is negative for all techniques. When this exercise is repeated
for net present value per unit of investment cost, technique (A) proves
to be optimal for all discount rates (for which N.P.V. using technique (A)
is positive in Figure 3(a)), and for all increases in the price of rice
within the above range.
Table 5 presents summarized rankings of techniques according to net
present value per unit of rough rice input when the shadow price of capital
used in Figure 3(a) is reduced by degrees until capital becomes a free
good . This is intended to show the implications of concessionary loans of
capital from external sources tied to specific forms of investment. It iS
assumed, however, that there are no differences in the terms on which loans
are made for specific techniques. These results are summarized in the
acceptance diagram in Figure 7. This exercise is not repeated for net
present value per unit of investment cost since the availability of capital22
Figure 3: Net present value
rough rice with ,PE :!O::;;;:;;; .
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Figure 4: Net present value per thousand tons of rough
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Figure 5: Net present value per million Rp. of
investment cost (million Rp.)
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at concessionary rates is inconsistent with i.nvestnentcost being the
binding constraint on government investment behavior.
Figure 6: Acceptance regions for rice milling facilities when
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b. Without price
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increase in price of rice
7. Conclusions
The most critical issue affecting the choice of technique in public
sector rice milling in Indonesia appears to be the assumption we make about
the constraints facing public investment. (i) If a “project” is defined
to be a unit of capital expenditure on rice milling facilities--implying
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the Small Rice Mill (A). (ii) If a “project” is defined to be a unit of
rough rice transferred from hand-pounding to mechanical milling--implying
that the supply of rough rice is the binding constraint--the optimal choice
could be any of the four techniques, depending on the other assumptions
(e.g. rice prices and sources of capital) and on value judgments (e.g. the
social rate of discount) that are made.
Considering case (ii), the optimal choice will be the Large Bulk
Facility (D) only if capital tied to investment in rice milling is avail-
able from external sources on terms so concessionary as to make capital
virtually a free good. The Small Bulk Facility (C) is most likely to be
optimal if the social rate of discount is high, and the price of milled
rice is expected to be higher than indicated in Table 1.. ‘1’he Large Rice
Mill (B) will be favored by low rice prices and social rates of discount
exceeding twelve percent, while the Small Rice Mill. is favored by low rice
prices and low social rates of discount.
We refrain from recommending any specific technique, since our gen-
eral conclusion is that “it all depends on...”. This is an important con-
clusion because there is a tendency among engineers and economists alike
to apply simplistic rules of thumb to questions of choice of technique. The
results of this study suggest that formal economic analysis of the issues
involved is not simply “helpful”; it is indispensable.29
FOOTNOTES
$r
This paper has benefited greatly from the counsel and assistance of
C. Peter Timmer, extending far beyond the normal duties of a thesis
advisor. The author is solely responsible for all views and any errors
it contains.
1Of the various studies propounding this approach, the analysis of this
paper is most compatible with that found in Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (2).
There are some notable differences, however.
2Weitz-Hettelsater (11).
3
In the Weitz-Hettelsater report and Timmer (9) these facilities are
identified by the symbols C, G, H-1, K-1 and Z, respectively, rather
than A, B, C, D and H, as above. See these sources for further
details on the characteristics of these facilities. The two different
unit labor requirements for hand-pounding are derived from Timmer (9, p. 27)
and Collier et al. (p. 112), respectively. No data is available on main-
tenance costs for the various facilities, so these costs are ignored here.
4Timmer (7, 8, 9 and 10).
5
There is disagreement, however, on the amount of hand-pounding with hired
labor that remains. See Timmer (8 and 10) and Collier et al.
6
For a fuller elaboration of this argument, see Sen (4).
7
See Sen (6, pp. 493-4) and the references cited therein.
8
It is important to recall that income distributional judgments are being
ignored here. Only aggregate consumption is being considered.
9
We assume that 107 workers are released from hand-pounding per 1000 tons
of rough rice diverted from that activity.
10
There is evidence, however, in support of a price differential between
hand-pounded and milled rice. See Timmer (1972).30
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